

~~TOP SECRET~~

14 Nov 1975

D
R
A
F
T

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with Mr. Rushford, House Select
Committee on Intelligence Staff

1. On Thursday afternoon, 13 November 1975, I was interviewed by Mr. Rushford of the House Select Committee on Intelligence staff. The interview lasted about one and one-quarter hours. The purpose of the interview, as stated by Mr. Rushford, was to look into SALT compliance in somewhat the same manner as the Committee had looked into the Tet Offensive and the Middle-East crisis.

2. Mr. Rushford does not understand the intelligence production process. He had the idea that I and the other senior analyst he would be talking to worked full time on SALT matters. He didn't realize that the men he would be talking to worked on evaluating strategic weapons systems and that SALT matters were only a small part of their total effort. He believes that there was a structured group that communicated almost hourly with the NSC staff on SALT matters. He asked me directly who I talked with on the NSC staff and how frequently. I replied that I rarely talked

~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRET

-2-

directly to anyone on the NSC staff and the last instance I could remember was a short conversation with Jan Lodat about two years ago.



25X1

4. Mr. Rushford asked if the Soviets knew when our overhead photographic systems were coming over. I said they had a general knowledge. He then asked if in knowing when our satellites were coming over, they could hide or cover objects to deny us information. I answered that it was possible, but in the submarine construction area, it more than likely would not be practicable as submarine pressure hull sections weight between 50 and 100 tons each. Any extra movement would be difficult and very

TOP SECRET

disruptive to production. It took a few moments for this to sink in, but he finally realized the magnitude of the problem.

5. Twice during the interview, Mr. Rushford asked me if I thought we needed more overhead photographic coverage, suggesting the committee might make some sort of recommendation about this. It seemed to be a bait that he was offering up for me to bit on. I said sure we could always use more, but that the number and type of photographic missions had to be balanced off with other collection systems and methods and I was not qualified to answer his question.

6. Toward the end of the interview, Mr. Rushford asked how NIE's were put together. Using 11-3/8-75 as an example, I described for him in general terms that the initial inputs were drafted by many interagency working groups and then integrated together by some of our people. However, when he realized that 11-3/8-75 was on all Soviet strategic systems and not just on SALT and SALT compliance, he dropped the subject.

7. About mid-way through the interview, Mr. Rushford stated that he had studied a lot of Russian history and

-4-

he "knew that the Soviets were going to cheat on any agreement." He asked for my opinion. I said that my personal subjective judgment was that while the Soviets might shade the spirit of an agreement, they most likely would adhere to the letter of an agreement. He did not pursue the discussion.

8. I was not impressed with the physical security of the working spaces of the committee staff (Room B-306, Rayburn Building). I saw no evidence of any ultrasonic alarms or magnetic switches on the main entrance door. While there was a guard desk just inside the main entrance, there were three different guards on duty during a two-hour period. There were no procedures for admitting staff members other than visual recognition by the guard. The door between the reception area and the staff work area was open most of the time. While I was waiting for Mr. Rushford to finish another interview, a reporter was sitting in the reception area with me and voices could be plainly heard from the staff work area.

OWI/NSD/TSSB

25X1

TOP SECRET

STAT

Approved For Release 2004/11/03 : CIA-RDP89B00552R000100110059-3

Next 5 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2004/11/03 : CIA-RDP89B00552R000100110059-3